The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

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Bibliographic Details
Published: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, c2012
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Series:Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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Format: Book

MARC

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035 |a (OCoLC)786002522 
040 |a DLC  |b eng  |e rda  |c DLC  |d BTCTA  |d UKMGB  |d BDX  |d YDXCP  |d OCLCO  |d CDX  |d BWX  |d NGU  |d ZCU  |d IG# 
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100 1 |a Svolik, Milan W.,  |d 1977- 
245 1 4 |a The politics of authoritarian rule /  |c Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
264 1 |a Cambridge :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c c2012 
300 |a xviii, 228 pages :  |b illustrations ;  |c 24 cm. 
336 |a text  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a unmediated  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a volume  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics 
520 |a "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"--  |b Provided by publisher. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 203-221) and index. 
505 0 |a 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing -- 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control -- 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. 
650 0 |a Authoritarianism. 
650 0 |a Authoritarianism  |v Case studies. 
830 0 |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics 
991 |a 2013-06-28 
992 |a Created by juth, 28/06/2013. Updated by alwh, 02/12/2014. 
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952 f f |p For loan  |a University Of Canterbury  |b UC Libraries  |c Central Library  |d Central Library, Level 8  |t 0  |e JC 480 .S87 2012  |h Library of Congress classification  |i Book  |m AU19484925B